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Namibia is still characterised by deep socio-economic inequalities, as economic structures have 
remained largely intact after independence. Poverty is still widespread and unemployment has 
remained high with women and youth being particularly affected. In 2002, the Namibian 
government’s Tax Commission proposed a universal cash grant as the most effective way to fight 
poverty and to reduce inequality. In 2004, the Basic Income Grant (BIG) Coalition was formed 
consisting of churches, trade unions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in support of the 
proposed grant. It implemented a pilot project to practically demonstrate the effects of the grant. 
The chosen location was the village of Otjivero where each inhabitant received a monthly cash grant 
of N$100 (US$9)beginning in January 2008. A research team closely monitored developments and 
found that within one year the rates of poverty, child malnutrition and school drop-outs had fallen 
significantly. Economic activities increased, school results and residents’ health status improved 
while the crime rate and women’s economic dependency on men were reduced. Despite these 
results, the Namibian government did not implement the BIG and the coalition failed to ignite a 
mass campaign. The country’s largest trade union federation did not play an active role and its 
leadership withdrew from the coalition despite support for the BIG among union members. The 
introduction of a BIG in Namibia will depend on the ability to the BIG coalition to create pressure 
‘from below’. Trade unions and youth organisations in particular will have to mobilise their 
membership and present the demand for the BIG as a form of economic justice. In terms of 
financial and economic resources, Namibia could easily afford a national BIG and its introduction is 





When Namibia achieved independence in 1990 it was one of  the countries with the highest 
levels of  income inequality. Over one hundred years of  apartheid-colonialism had created 
inequalities in all spheres of  life which manifested themselves along racial, class and gender lines. A 
report by the World Bank (1991) stated that about 5% of  the population (whites) controlled over 
70% of  the country’s GDP. It is estimated that at Independence some two-thirds of  the population 
were living in conditions of  absolute poverty. The entrapment of  the black majority in poverty was 
the product of  a systematic system of  labour exploitation. Blacks were denied the means to progress 
to higher levels within the labour market and were largely confined to wage labour at the most basic 
levels. Excluded from the bulk of  managerial, professional and administrative jobs, and with wages 
below the poverty level, black Namibians found it difficult to move beyond the confines of  poverty. 
However, there was a hierarchy of  poverty: the urban poor were better off  than people living in 
peri-urban areas, who in turn were better off  than rural families (World Bank, 1991; SWAPO, 1981).  
About half  of  the black working population were engaged in subsistence agriculture in the 
communal ‘homelands’. Approximately 25% were poorly paid migrant workers, about 14% were 
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employed as poorly paid domestic workers, and the rest were either unemployed or engaged in a 
variety of  informal-sector activities. According to a study by the United Nations Institute for 
Namibia (UNIN), the income differentials between white and black Namibians far exceeded what 
could be justified by the skill differentials. Even where they did the same job, there were substantial 
differences in remuneration (UNIN, 1986).  
The white population as a whole benefited from permanent jobs, subsidised housing, health 
care and superior schools, which were also racially stratified. Almost the entire white labour force 
had secured employment as professionals, managers, supervisors, technicians, civil servants or as 
business people in agriculture, industry, commerce and government. A far greater proportion of  the 
national budget was set aside for the white population. Expenditure on health care resources for the 
white population differed from that reserved for the black population, at a scale of  about 10:1. 
Similar discrepancies existed in the provision of  pensions and education services. In 1986–1987, the 
colonial administration spent some R3 213 per white student compared to R329 per black student 




Although apartheid ended with the achievement of  independence in 1990 and a liberal, 
western form of  parliamentary democracy was introduced, Namibia remains a deeply divided society 
today. One of  the immediate steps taken by the Namibian government after independence was to 
reform the provision of  basic social services such as education and health care with the aim of  
ending apartheid discrimination and redressing some of  the colonial imbalances. ‘Education for all’ 
became a rallying cry of  the Ministry as educational services were extended country-wide. The 
Namibian Constitution guarantees the right to free and compulsory education for ten years (until the 
age of  16), and government consistently allocated over 20% of  its national budget to the education 
sector. 
A unified system of  educational administration was established to replace the ethnic education 
bodies, and hundreds of  schools were built to cater for the increased school enrolment. The 
Ministry or Education and Culture realised the need to provide sufficient and adequately staffed and 
equipped classrooms to address the colonial legacy of  neglect. Equitable access to schooling was 
recognised as a critical aspect in the process of  redressing inequality (Ministry of  Education and 
Culture, 1993). 
Despite having achieved significant improvements in making education accessible, the quality 
of  education is still grossly unequal between different schools and regions. This is reflected in the 
results of  external school examinations at the end of  Grades 10 and 12. The best results are usually 
achieved by private schools, which are expensive and thus only accessible to the elite. The next best 
results tend to be achieved by the former white schools in towns while the worst results are found in 
rural schools.  
In the economic sphere the post-independence changes were very cautious and far from 
transformative. Despite rhetorical commitment to socialism in the 1970s and early 1980s, Namibia’s 
ruling party and former liberation movement, the South West Africa People’s Organisation 
(SWAPO), signalled its willingness to follow ‘pragmatic’ policies even before it took power. SWAPO 
regarded national independence (and not the ‘proletarian revolution’) as the primary goal of  its 
struggle. This was clearly reflected in the party’s policy proposals for an independent Namibia in the 
late 1980s as well as the election manifesto of  1989. When SWAPO’s ‘Economic Policy Position 
Document’ was released in November 1988, it no longer called for the nationalisation of  key 
industries but instead promised ‘fair and just compensation in those instances where state acquisition 
of  assets from private hands is considered necessary for the rebuilding and restructuring of  
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The gradual change that occurred in Namibia during the past twenty-five years meant that the 
country retained a high Gini co-efficient of  around 0.6, and unemployment remained a serious 
challenge. In 1997 Namibia conducted its first Labour Force Survey which recorded an overall 
unemployment rate of  34.5% (according to the broad definition, which is being without work while 
being available to work) (Ministry of  Labour, 2000). This figure increased to 36.7% in 2004 and 
further to a record 51.2% in 2008. The situation for women and young Namibians was far worse, 
with youth unemployment reaching around 75% in 2008 as indicated in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Percentage Unemployment, 1997–2013 
Year 1997 2000 2004 2008 2012 2013 
Overall unemployment 35 34 37 51 27 30 
Unemployment among women  40 39 43 58 32 33 
Unemployment among youth 
(15–24 years) 
58 67 61 75 52 61 
Source: Namibia Labour Force Surveys 1997, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2013 
 
 
However, the Labour Force Survey of  2012 presented new figures which contradicted the 
trend. It found an overall unemployment rate of  ‘only’ 27.4% with a rate of  31.8% among women 
and 52% among youth. Furthermore, the total number of  employed people in Namibia, which had 
declined from 401 203 in 1997 to 385 329 in 2004 and further to 331 444 in 2008 suddenly increased 
to 630 094 in 2012. This reversal of  unemployment trends is not based on new jobs being created 
but resulted from a new methodology to measure employment: the 2012 Labour Force Survey 
probed if  a person was engaged in any type of  economic activity of  one hour in the last week, 
including looking after animals, fixing a fence, catching fish, collecting firewood, repairing household 
items, etc. Anybody engaged in any such activity for at least one hour was then counted as employed, 
bringing down the official unemployment rate. Consequently almost all Namibians engaged in rural 
subsistence agriculture as well as those looking after families at home were classified as employed in 
2012. However, despite these statistical changes there is no doubt that unemployment is still a huge 
challenge for many Namibians today. The figures for 2013 confirm that unemployment is still rising, 
particularly among young people. 
Namibia’s widespread unemployment is made worse by the fact that many Namibian 
households (close to 50%) depend on one main wage earner and thus unemployment has an 
immediate effect on household survival.  
According to the World Bank, Namibia has made significant strides in economic and social 
progress, especially when it comes to social spending. It notes that the country is in the top ten 
globally in terms of  percentage of  GDP spent on education, and ranks second only to South Africa 
on the continent when it comes to expenditure on health (World Bank, 2008). Namibia experienced 
steady if  unspectacular economic growth, hovering around the 3–4% range, while inflation remained 
in the range of  2–11%, mostly around 7% during the past decade (Jauch, Edwards and Cupido, 
2009). 
However, poverty still affects a large number of  Namibians. It can be measured in different 
ways and the methodology used will determine to a significant extent who will be counted as poor. 
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In 2004, the Namibian government used the food-ratio method, whereby the definition of  poverty 
is determined solely by the proportional expenditure on food: those who spend at least 60%of  their 
total expenditure on food are regarded as poor while those who spend at least 80% are regarded as 
‘severely poor’. Poverty can, however, be measured and assessed very differently, for example, by 
establishing a ‘basket’ of  essential food and non-food items needed for household survival. A 
monetary value for such a basket could be calculated and then used as the standard for measuring 
poverty. This was attempted by the University of  Port Elizabeth through the ‘Household 
Subsistence Level’ (HSL) (Potgieter, 1997). Adjusting these figures by the annual inflation rate would 
have meant that about 82% of  Namibians were living below the poverty line of  N$399.80 per 
person per month. Applying the crude international poverty line of  US$1 per person per day would 
have resulted in 62% of  Namibians being regarded as poor (LaRRI, 2006; also see Table 2).  
In 2008, the Central Bureau of  Statistics (CBS) adopted a new approach to measuring poverty 
by determining a food basket based on actual consumption patterns in low-income households plus 
the cost of  certain non-food requirements. At 2004 price levels, adult persons with consumption 
levels of  below N$262 were regarded as poor and those with consumption levels of  below N$184 as 
extremely poor. This resulted in 27.6% of  Namibians being classified as poor, with 13.8% being 
extremely poor (CBS, 2008). 
 
 
Table 2:  Poverty in Namibia according to various measures 
Source Measure % of  Namibians 
living in poverty 
Household Subsistence Level 
(University of Port Elizabeth) 
Basket of  essential goods and 
services (N$399.80 per person 
per month in 2004) 
82 
Crude international poverty line  US$1 per day 62 
Namibia Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey (2004) 
At least 60% of  income spent 
on food 
28 
Review of  Poverty and 
Inequality in Namibia (CSI, 
2008) 
Basic needs (N$262.45 per 
person per month in 2004) 
28 
Sources: LaRRI, 2006; Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008 
 
 
No matter which definition is applied, there is no doubt that unemployment, inequality and 
poverty are key challenges for Namibia today. Although there is a universal old age pension of  
N$600 for every person reaching 60 years of  age, there is no universal social protection as those 
outside formal employment are practically excluded from the provisions of  the Social Security Act. 
There is also no insurance against unemployment and no national health insurance. However, 
according to World Bank figures, Namibia is an upper-middle income country with a GDP of  
US$12.3 billion and a per capita income of  US$4 700 (www.worldbank.org/en/country/namibia). 
This figure was simply derived by dividing the country’s GDP by the number of  inhabitants. The 
resulting average of  US$4 700 hides the fact that most GDP benefits only a small elite and the 
transnational corporations controlling the country’s natural resources while the vast majority of  
Namibians have to survive on just a fraction of  the average GDP per capita.  
 
 
The Proposal for a Basic Income Grant
The first suggestion for a Basic Income Grant (BIG) came from the Namibian government’s 
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tax commission (NAMTAX), which proposed a universal grant as the most effective way to fight 
poverty and to reduce inequality in a short period of  time. The Commission suggested that the grant 
should be financed through a progressive expenditure tax on the affluent (Haarmann et al., 2009), 
and pointed out that sustainable economic development in Namibia would be unachievable if  
poverty and inequality were not redressed. At the time (2002), NAMTAX proposed that the 
universal grant should be set at not less than N$70 per person per month, and calculated the total 
cost to be N$1.156 billion per year. It proposed that this could be financed through an increase in 
the value-added tax of  6.5% or alternatively by introducing a bed tax or tourist levy and by 
increasing the excise tax on alcohol, tobacco, luxury cars and so on. In such a case, a VAT increase 
of  4.5% would suffice (Haarmann, 2005). Although the Commission’s recommendations were not 
widely circulated and initially hardly debated in public, they provided an impetus for the later 
formation of  Namibia’s BIG Coalition and the campaign for the introduction of  a BIG in Namibia. 
In 2004, spearheaded by the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the Republic of  Namibia 
(ELCRN), a cross-section of  Namibian civil society organisations set up a Coalition to promote the 
introduction of  a BIG for all Namibians. The BIG Coalition brought together different umbrella 
bodies such as the Council of  Churches in Namibia (CCN), the National Union of  Namibian 
Workers (NUNW), the Namibian NGO Forum (NANGOF) and the Namibian Network of  AIDS 
Service Organisations (NANASO) as well as the Legal Assistance Centre (LAC) and the Labour 
Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI). Later on, the National Youth Council (NYC) and the 
Church Alliance for orphans (CAFO) also joined the Coalition. The ELCRN’s Desk for Social 
Development (DfSD) provided secretarial services for the Coalition and co-ordinated its work. The 
idea of  a BIG found support even beyond the Coalition’s member organisations as numerous 
groups and individuals, including local businesspeople, churches and international agencies, gave 
support and encouragement. Some government ministers and senior officials also showed interest 
and indicated their willingness to develop a more universalistic system of  social protection and 
economic empowerment (Haarmann et.al., 2009). 
The proposal regarding the BIG Coalition was in line with the NAMTAX recommendation 
and stated that all Namibians should have a citizenship right to a Basic Income Grant of  not less 
than N$100 per month until they became eligible for the social pension upon turning 60 years of  
age. The BIG thus constituted a cash transfer which would allow recipients to decide freely how to 
spend the money, taking their personal circumstances into account. Thus the BIG was envisaged as 
an act of  empowerment by giving people enhanced freedom and personal responsibility. It was 
conceptualised as an economic right and not as an act of  charity. The chairperson of  the BIG 
Coalition, Bishop Dr Zephania Kameeta (2009: viii), stated, ‘I am convinced that the BIG is not 
only able to eradicate destitution, hunger and malnutrition, but that it lays a strong foundation for 
economic empowerment, responsibility and ownership taking. The BIG, by restoring the human 
dignity of  people, frees people to become active and proud members of  this society’.  
The proposed BIG was essentially seen as an effective instrument to fight poverty, introduce 
an economic right and provide dignity. The proposed amount of  N$100 (about €10 or US$12 at the 
time) constituted only about a third of  what was needed to rise above the poverty level. Thus the 
BIG at that low level was insufficient on its own to wipe out poverty. However, it would have been 
enough to guarantee some basic food security and thus was a step towards the realisation of  the 
basic right of  each person to enjoy a reasonable standard of  living. As set out in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),1 a minimum income should be 
regarded as a basic human right independent of  the right to work. Article 11 recognises the right of  
every person to enjoy an adequate standard of  living, including food, clothing and housing, without 
any precondition to be fulfilled. The right to work is regarded as another human right but work is 
not a precondition for the enjoyment of  a minimum income that covers basic needs (Künnemann, 
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2007). 
Article 95 of  the Namibian Constitution obliges the state to promote and maintain the welfare 
of  the people by inter alia: promoting policies aimed at creating ‘equality of  opportunity for women 
that enables them to participate fully in all spheres of  society’; by enacting laws that promote the 
health and strength of  workers; by actively encouraging the formation of  independent trade unions; 
by ensuring fair and reasonable access to public facilities for all citizens; by ensuring the pensioners 
receive a regular and adequate pension; by enacting legislation that ensures that the unemployed, 
incapacitated and disadvantaged enjoy social benefits and amenities; by ensuring that workers are 
paid a living wage for the maintenance of  a decent standard of  living; by consistently ‘planning to 
raise and maintain an acceptable level of  nutrition and standard of  living of  the Namibian people 
and to improve public health’; by encouraging the mass of  the population to influence government 
policy by debating its decisions; etc. Thus the proposals for a BIG squarely fit into this constitutional 
provision and Namibia’s BIG Coalition was hopeful that it could convince and encourage 
government to implement the grant.  
The main focus of  the Coalition’s strategy in the first three years was to engage policy makers 
and to convince them that a BIG was both an efficient and an affordable tool to fight poverty. It 
argued that the BIG was a basic economic right in line with the welfare provision of  the Namibian 
Constitution. Given the low levels of  Namibia’s indebtedness, the low administrative costs of  a BIG 
pay-out and the broad level of  its representativeness, the Coalition believed that it could push 
government towards the implementation of  a national BIG. However, things turned out differently.  
 
 
The Need to Campaign
 Despite the seemingly convincing arguments for the viability of  a BIG, the Namibian 
government remained divided. The Finance Ministry in particular remained doubtful as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank strongly advised against a universal cash grant 
although it would have required only around 5% of  Namibia’s national budget, which could have 
been raised through tax adjustments. The BIG Coalition thus realised that it needed to increase the 
pressure and introduce a visible campaign to force government’s hand. The Coalition’s chairperson, 
Bishop Kameeta, suggested that the best way to convince government was to show how a BIG 
would work in practice, and thus the Coalition decided to select a particular town, village or 
settlement where a BIG could be implemented and to document its impact. The Coalition then 
travelled to various regions to look for possible locations and chose the settlement of  Otjivero in the 
Omitara district, about 100 km east of  Windhoek. This settlement became the site of  the BIG pilot 
project in 2008 and 2009. It was funded through local and international donations, mostly from 
churches in Germany. 
 
 
The BIG in Otjivero
In 2007, Otjivero was a small settlement of  about a thousand people who lived on a strip of  
state-owned land leading to the Otjivero dam. The surrounding land consisted of  commercial farms, 
mostly owned by German-speaking farmers. Many of  the Otjivero residents were former farm 
workers who had lost their jobs and had then been evicted from the farms with nowhere else to go. 
Most lived in shacks made of  plastic, wood and zinc, and poverty was widespread. The BIG 
Coalition visited the settlement several times to discuss the possibility of  introducing a BIG pilot 
there. 
The Otjivero community met under the central ‘village tree’ and asked critical questions about 
the BIG as they were suspicious about the promises of  development aid that had been made in past 
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years. Also, the idea of  a BIG was completely new to the residents, and the Coalition could only 
guarantee the grant for a two-year period during which the Namibian government needed to be 
convinced to introduce the BIG nationally. The community agreed to become the site of  the BIG 
pilot phase and embarked on their own process of  mobilisation and conscientisation without any 
outside interference. The residents decided to elect an eighteen-member ‘BIG Committee’ to guide 
the pilot project within the community and to assist residents as well as the BIG Coalition whenever 
the need arose. The committee consisted of  local teachers, the nurse, representatives of  the police as 
well as small business people such as shebeen2 owners and other community members (Haarmann et 
al., 2009).  
The community felt that, unlike other ‘development projects’, the BIG pilot project gave them 
ownership of  the process and responsibility for the outcome. They wanted to ensure the best 
possible impact of  the BIG on the lives of  individual residents and the wider community. Recipients 
of  the grant could freely choose what to do with the money although the community’s BIG 
Committee developed a strict code of  conduct and wanted to ensure that residents made the best 
possible use of  their BIG payments. Thus the committee understood its role as raising awareness 
and providing advice. The committee was conscious of  the widespread problem of  alcohol abuse 
and paid special attention to this problem during the pilot project. Shebeen owners were represented 
on the committee and agreed not to open their shebeens on the days the BIG was paid out. The 
challenge of  alcoholism was openly discussed from the outset and addressed through a process of  
community discussions (Haarmann et al., 2009).  
The role of  the BIG Coalition was merely to facilitate the registration of  all residents for the 
BIG payments, to issue smart cards for easy identification and payments, and to document the 
socio-economic changes resulting from the BIG. Initially a private company was responsible for the 
monthly pay-out but this was changed to the state-owned Namibia Post Office (Nampost) which set 
up a satellite post office in Otjivero to facilitate easy access for the residents. The residents opened 
post office accounts and Nampost agreed to two free withdrawals per person per month. Overall the 
administrative costs for facilitating the BIG payments amounted to less than 10% of  the amount 
paid out, which made the BIG one of  the most cost-effective social payments. 
Developments in Otjivero were closely monitored by a team of  local and international social 
scientists. They first documented the socio-economic conditions in Otjivero ahead of  the 
introduction of  the BIG and then continuously monitored the changes that occurred after its 
implementation. Four complementary methods were used: after the initial baseline study, panel 
surveys were conducted in July and November 2008; information was gathered from key informants 
(such as the local nurse, teachers, the police, etc.); and detailed case studies of  individuals living in 




The research report outlined the key changes that occurred in Otjivero within twelve months 
of  the introduction of  the BIG: 
 
Before the introduction of  the BIG, Otjivero was characterised by unemployment, hunger 
and poverty. Most residents had settled there because they had nowhere else to go, their lives 
were shaped by deprivation and they had little hope for the future. 
The introduction of  the BIG ignited hope and the community responded by establishing its 
own eighteen-member committee to mobilise the community and to advise residents on how 
to spend the BIG money wisely. This suggests that the introduction of  a BIG can effectively 
assist with community mobilisation.  
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As the BIG was only introduced in one particular location, there was a significant migration 
towards Otjivero. Impoverished family members moved into Otjivero, attracted by the BIG. 
Even if  migrants themselves did not receive the grant, this points to the need to introduce 
the BIG as a universal national grant in order to avoid migration to particular regions, towns 
or households. 
Since the introduction of  the BIG, household poverty has dropped significantly. Using the 
food poverty line, 76% of  residents fell below this line in November 2007. This was reduced 
to 37% within one year of  the BIG. Among households that were not affected by in-
migration, the rate dropped to 16%. This shows that a national BIG would have a dramatic 
impact on poverty levels in Namibia. 
The introduction of  the BIG has led to an increase in economic activity. The rate of  those 
engaged in income-generating activities (above the age of  15) increased from 44% to 55%. 
Thus the BIG enabled recipients to increase their work both for pay, profit or family gain as 
well as self-employment. The grant enabled recipients to increase their productive income 
earned, particularly through starting their own small business, including brick-making, baking 
of  bread and dress-making. The BIG contributed to the creation of  a local market by 
increasing households’ buying power. This finding contradicts critics’ claims that the BIG 
would lead to laziness and dependency.  
The BIG resulted in a huge reduction of  child malnutrition. Using a WHO measurement 
technique, the data shows that children’s weight-for-age has improved significantly in just six 
months from 42% of  underweight children in November 2007 to 17% in June 2008 and 
10% in November 2008.  
HIV-positive residents’ access to anti-retrovirals (ARVs) was hampered by poverty and a lack 
of  transport before the BIG was introduced. The BIG enabled them to afford nutritious 
food and gain access to the medication. This was further enhanced by government’s decision 
to make ARVs available in Otjivero, freeing residents from the need to travel to Gobabis, a 
town situated over a hundred km away. 
Before the introduction of  the BIG, almost half  of  the school-going children did not attend 
school regularly. Pass rates stood at about 40% and drop-out rates were high. Many parents 
were unable to pay the school fee. After the introduction of  the BIG, more than double the 
number of  parents paid school fees (90%) and most of  the children now have school 
uniforms. Non-attendance due to financial reasons dropped by 42% and this rate would have 
been even higher without the effects of  migration towards Otjivero. Drop-out rates at the 
school fell from almost 40% in November 2007 to 5% in June 2008 and further to almost 
0% in November 2008. 
The residents have been using the settlement’s health clinic much more regularly since the 
introduction of  the BIG. Residents now pay the N$4 payment for each visit and the income 
of  the clinic has increased fivefold from N$250 per month to about N$1 300. 
The BIG has contributed to a significant reduction of  crime. Overall crime rates – as 
reported to the local police station – fell by 42% while stock theft fell by 43% and other 
theft by nearly 20%. 
The introduction of  the Basic Income Grant has reduced the dependency of  women on 
men for their survival. The BIG has given women a measure of  control over their own 
sexuality, freeing them to some extent from the pressure to engage in transactional sex. 
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The criticism that the BIG is leading to increasing alcoholism is not supported by empirical 
evidence. The community committee is trying to curb alcoholism and has reached an 
agreement with local shebeen owners not to sell alcohol on the day of  the pay-out of  the 
grants. (Haarmann et al., 2009). 
 
Encouraged by these results, the BIG Coalition was optimistic that it could convince the 
Namibian government to introduce a Basic Income Grant. It distributed the findings widely in the 
local media, held regular media briefings, participated in radio and TV programmes, invited 
journalist to visit Otjivero and also made the results known internationally resulting in several print 
and electronic media journalists visiting the settlement. The Coalition also embarked on a series of  
meetings across the country to introduce the idea of  a BIG and to share the impact it has had in 
Otjivero. Some of  these meetings were addressed by residents of  Otjivero themselves to facilitate a 
direct exchange between them and Namibians in other regions of  the country. The Coalition had 
hoped that these exchanges would lead to a growing demand for the introduction of  a BIG 
elsewhere. In addition, the leadership of  the Coalition’s member organisations held meetings with 
some of  the country’s key political leaders, administrators and regional politicians, hoping to 
convince them about the benefits of  a national BIG.  
In order to create a large number of  cadres to campaign for a national BIG, the Coalition 
convened a workshop for young people from all corners of  Namibia who supported the idea of  a 
BIG and were thus trained to become ‘BIG ambassadors’ in their respective regions. They were 
introduced to the ongoing challenges of  poverty and inequality and how the BIG could play a role in 
redressing them. Finally, the Coalition invited Namibian parliamentarians to visit Otjivero to gain 
first-hand impressions about the impact of  the BIG there. Most were from the ruling SWAPO party 
and although some had reservations before the visit, they were all convinced of  the effectiveness of  
the BIG after gaining personal insights in Otjivero. 
 
 
Resistance to the BIG
It thus seemed that the introduction of  a national BIG was possible. The results of  the BIG in 
Otjivero were generally appreciated in the public debates and several politicians supported the idea, 
but there were also dissenting voices. A German economist who worked for the now-defunct 
Namibia Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU) at the time, tried to portray the research results 
from Otjivero as unscientific and biased and cast doubt about the real impact of  the BIG (see for 
example R. Osterkamp in New Era, 24 October 2008, and in Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 October 2008). 
Resistance against the BIG also came from the IMF which used inflated figures regarding the costs 
of  a national BIG and warned that it would be unaffordable. The IMF did not distinguish between 
the nominal costs of  a BIG and the real ones, ignoring the fact that pensioners would not receive 
the BIG. The IMF also ignored the proposal that the BIG would be nominally paid to higher-
income earners but could be recovered by the fiscus immediately through an adjustment in the 
personal tax rates. Even after a meeting with the BIG Coalition during which the IMF had to admit 
that its cost calculations were wrong, it continued circulating the wrong figures in its press 
statements.  
Some local politicians then joined the bandwagon and questioned if  a BIG would be a suitable 
strategy to wipe out poverty. They also questioned why the grant should be given to everybody and 
not just to the poor, and argued that it might be better to create jobs instead of  giving ‘hand-outs’. 
Such arguments ignored the emancipatory aspect of  a BIG as well as the country’s growing levels of  
unemployment which made the suggested choice between a job and the BIG a mockery. 
Although the Namibian government had not pronounced itself  officially on the BIG and 
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seemed divided, Namibian President Hifikepunye Pohamba took a position against the grant in early 
2010 after delivering a speech in Parliament. When asked by an Opposition Member of  Parliament 
(MP) about his views on the proposed BIG, he replied that he was afraid it might make people lazy. 
This signalled that the Namibian government had no intention to introduce a BIG, and the BIG 
campaign suffered a heavy set-back. President Pohamba then repeated his objection to the BIG in 
Parliament in 2014 (The Namibian, 4 April 2014). Although some politicians still privately supported 
the idea of  a BIG, the MPs of  the ruling party started echoing the President’s sentiments which 
ignored the available evidence form Otjivero. The BIG had not made people lazy but on the 
contrary enabled economic activities at a very basic level such as baking bread, sewing clothes, fixing 
shoes, operating hair salons and making bricks. These activities were sustained by the BIG, which 
created a local market as a precondition for sustained, mostly informal economic activities.  
 
 
The Role of Trade Unions
The country’s largest trade union federation, the National Union of  Namibian Workers 
(NUNW) joined the BIG Coalition when it was formed in 2004. With a total membership of  about 
60 000 to 70 000 spread among eight industrial unions organising in all sectors of  the formal 
economy, the NUNW was a critical constituent organisation and had proven its ability to organise 
large numbers of  workers in the run-up to Namibia’s independence. Even after independence, the 
NUNW had political clout and it supported the BIG idea as part of  a strategy to fight poverty and 
to secure a basic standard of  living for all. The NUNW’s acting general secretary Peter Naholo 
stated: 
 
as a labour movement … we will always remain firm and ready to embrace and support the 
struggle for social justice and economic emancipation. It has always been and remains our 
sacred belief that there will be nothing about us without us as workers. Therefore we have 
come out in our multitudes today to support this noble initiative [Basic Income Grant]. In 
view of the current onslaught on the job opportunities of our members whereby 
retrenchments and job losses are the order of the day, obviously the Basic Income Grant 
would ultimately serve as a fall-back position for the retrenched workers. When a worker is 
retrenched, it simply means loss of income. Loss of income means loss of hope. Without 
hope, life is shattered. Therefore, we need to provide hope for them, we must enable them 
to appreciate that there is always life after retrenchment (quoted in Haarmann, 2005: 8).  
 
This indicates that although the NUNW understood the BIG as part of the struggle for socio-
economic justice, it conceptualised the BIG more as a social safety net than as an economic 
entitlement. This conceptualisation might explain why Namibian unions never regarded the BIG as a 
strategic priority in the struggle for economic emancipation.  
For several years, the NUNW expressed support for the BIG campaign and attended some of  
the Coalition meetings. It was due to political developments within the federation that labour’s 
contribution to the BIG campaign declined in subsequent years. During the NUNW’s Congress of  
2006, the federation became deeply divided over the question of  political succession within the 
ruling SWAPO party to whom the NUNW is affiliated. The NUNW basically split into two camps, 
one supporting the founding President Sam Nujoma and his chosen successor Hifikepunje 
Pohamba, and the other faction supporting Hidipo Hamutenya. The acting NUNW general 
secretary at the time, Peter Naholo, was part of  the group supporting Hamutenya. Naholo was 
suspended just ahead of  the NUNW Congress and subsequently outvoted. The Congress left the 
NUNW deeply divided and the new leadership consisted essentially of  people supportive of  the 
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Nujoma group (Jauch, 2007). They treated the BIG Coalition with some suspicion, questioned the 
Coalition’s political motives and consequently played hardly any role in the BIG campaign. 
In July 2010, following Presidents Pohamba’s dismissal of  the BIG idea, the NUNW’s Central 
Executive Committee (CEC) decided to resign from the BIG Coalition. This decision was taken 
without a mandate from members, as became apparent during the NUNW Congress of  September 
2010. The Congress was held under the theme ‘Back to Basics: Workers Take Control of  Trade 
Unions for Economic Emancipation’. It promised heated debates, and two issues in particular were 
expected to be contested, namely the NUNW’s withdrawal from the BIG Coalition and the 
corruption and mismanagement surrounding the Government Institutions Pension Fund (GIPF). 
Although some union leaders tried to stifle debate on the BIG, workers resisted from the floor and 
discussed the issue for several hours. In the end, they decided that the NUNW should rejoin the 
BIG Coalition and that the BIG should be part of  a broader initiative to fight poverty and to effect 
structural economic transformation.  
This decision was significant in various respects: firstly it contradicted the expressed 
sentiments on a national BIG as expressed by Namibia’s former Prime Minister Nahas Angula and 
President Pohamba, and it nullified the decision taken by the NUNW’s CEC just weeks before the 
Congress. This was a clear sign how removed some trade union leaders had become from their base 
and pointed to a lack of  accountability through mandates and feed-backs within the labour 
movement. The Congress decision on the BIG was meant not only to re-direct the NUNW 
leadership but also to increase the pressure on the Namibian government to seriously consider the 
introduction of  a national BIG as a tool to fight poverty. Workers expressed their views loud and 
clear, and the resolutions passed were supposed to guide the NUNW leadership in the years to come 
(Jauch, Windhoek Observer, 10–16 September 2010). However, the deep divisions within the NUNW 
and political pressure to ‘soften’ the resolutions taken meant that the workers’ mandate was never 
implemented. The NUNW did not rejoin the BIG Coalition and the elected NUNW general 
secretary was (unfairly) dismissed while the elected NUNW president was suspended in 2012. These 
internal union struggles weakened the struggle for a BIG substantially as the NUNW failed to use its 
political influence to shift the public debate and the government position in line with the views 
expressed by workers during the 2010 Congress.  
Namibia’s second trade union federation, the Trade Union Congress of  Namibia (TUCNA), 
never participated in the public BIG debates. The federation felt snubbed by the BIG Coalition as 
only the NUNW had been invited when the coalition was formed. However, TUCNA is sympathetic 
to the idea and mentions the BIG in its national development policy as a measure to redress poverty 
(M. Kavihuha, general secretary, personal communication, 7 November 2014). Like the NUNW, 





Despite the promising results in Otjivero and the growing interest in the idea of  a universal 
BIG, the Coalition did not manage to ignite a sustainable campaign to put government under 
pressure to implement the grant. When it became apparent that the Namibian government would 
not be easily swayed, significant parts of  the Coalition’s member organisation withdrew their active 
participation. The churches, which had been the driving force behind the BIG Coalition, were 
reluctant to take a more challenging position and did not want to differ openly with government 
over the BIG. The youth organisations under the NYC hardly attended coalition meetings and did 
not propose or ignite any grassroots mobilisation around the BIG, while the NGOs remained 
equally passive. Even the youth volunteers that had been recruited as BIG ambassadors did not 
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manage to mobilise visible support for a national BIG in their respective regions, and thus there was 
very little pressure on the Namibian government to change its stance. 
Unlike in the late 1980s when the student and labour movements played a central role in 
mobilising their members and supporters in large numbers, the BIG campaign remained at the level 
of  providing good arguments for its implementation and pointing to the benefits to be derived in 
terms of  a substantial poverty reduction. Trade unions should have raised the issue of  economic 
justice as a central theme and thrown their weight behind the BIG campaign since the grant would 
have constituted a practical step towards the implementation of  an economic right. It would have 
taken household incomes beyond the confines of  wage labour, but Namibian unions did not seize 
this opportunity. This was possibly the most crucial shortcoming in Namibia’s efforts to introduce 
the BIG. 
The inhabitants of  Otjivero are now facing a dramatic worsening of  their living conditions, 
and some of  the achievements made since the introduction of  the BIG are under threat. BIG 
payments are no longer regular and depend on available donations. This makes the economic basis 
for survival unpredictable for the inhabitants of  Otjivero and also undermines the emancipatory 
aspect of  the grant. Inhabitants once again have to rely on others for survival in contradiction to the 
BIG’s aim of  ensuring a basic economic right. Critics and opponents of  the BIG thus have cynically 
used this opportunity to claim that Otjivero has shown that the BIG in unsustainable. 
Following the presidential and parliamentary elections of  2014, a new administration took 
office in March 2015. The new President, Dr Hage Geingob, announced that the eradication of  
poverty would be a key focus of  his administration, and he established a new Ministry of  Poverty 
Eradication and Social Welfare, headed by the former chairperson of  the BIG Coalition, Bishop 
Kameeta. This has given renewed hope that the Namibian government might consider the 




The formation of  a broad and representative coalition of  various civil society organisations 
including unions, churches and NGOs was certainly an important step toward generating support 
for a Basic Income Grant. Unlike other social grants, the BIG would have constituted an economic 
right and thus is a qualitatively different intervention. The pilot project in Otjivero has clearly shown 
that a host of  social and economic benefits will be derived from the BIG, and that the 10% 
administrative costs are far smaller than those of  any other existing programme, making the BIG a 
highly cost-effective grant. The positive results from the pilot project were not only recognised 
inside Namibia but also internationally, for example when the UN Special Representative Magdalena 
Sepúlveda visited Otjivero in 2012 and pointed out that the BIG had achieved many positive results 
(http://www.az.com.na/soziales/initiative-gegen-armut-gelobt.156809.php). She supported the 
implementation of  a country-wide BIG as an effective tool to fight poverty. 
Means-tested grants do not constitute economic rights and require substantial resources for 
their administration. Means-testing also leads to stigmatisation and exclusion of  some people who 
are meant to be reached. In addition, means testing can lead to corruption and clientelism and is 
likely to have unintended side-effects. It can divide communities like Otjivero and can lead to 
unintended punishment of  those who do find a job. For example, if  only people earning less than 
R800 per month were entitled to receive a BIG, an unemployed person who would find a job as a 
farm worker, earning R900 would then be punished by losing the grant. 
In Namibia, like elsewhere in Africa, most household incomes are irregular and can change 
from month to month. Thus means-testing would have to be conducted on a continuous basis, and 
households would be encouraged to understate their real income in order to receive the grant. A 
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universal BIG, on the other hand, would be easy to calculate in terms of  costs, it would guarantee all 
households a certain amount of  income security, it would reduce the dependency of  many women 
on their male partners, and it would guarantee everybody an income outside the exploitative 
relations of  wage labour. Vulnerable workers in low-income jobs would also be afforded the 
opportunity to reject some of  the most exploitative jobs as their survival would not solely depend 
on those jobs. 
Despite these convincing arguments and the lived experiences in Otjivero, the introduction of  
a BIG in Namibia will essentially depend on the ability to the BIG coalition to re-ignite the 
campaign and to create pressure ‘from below’. This will require particularly trade unions and youth 
organisations to mobilise their membership. Namibia’s labour movement could have utilised the 
opportunity to become a central driver of  the BIG campaign by shifting the debate beyond merely 
addressing poverty towards a conceptualisation of  the BIG as a step towards the realisation of  
guaranteed economic rights; it has not done so. Given Namibia’s pervasive levels of  socio-economic 
inequality, trade unions could also have linked the demand for a BIG to further redistributive 
measures in favour of  their working-class constituency and the poor in general. They should have 
located the BIG at the centre of  a debate on the need for socio-economic justice in Namibia today. 
TUCNA’s recent development policy document of  2015 calls for the creation of  a ‘sovereign wealth 
fund’ into which a substantial share of  the proceeds from natural resources such as land, minerals, 
diamonds and fish could be paid. TUCNA argues that such a fund must benefit the vast majority of  
the population instead of  leaving the benefits from the country’s resources in the hands of  a small 
elite. 
In terms of  financial and economic resources, there is no doubt that Namibia could easily 
afford a national BIG, even at a higher level than the one used for the pilot. It is merely a question 
of  political will, as the resistance does not only come from within government but also from 
international organisations like the IMF and World Bank, and to some extent even the ILO who use 
their influence to lobby for social protection but advise against more substantive redistributive 
measures that entrench economic rights. Progressive organisations, in particular trade unions, thus 
need to build a counter-hegemony if  they want to make the BIG a reality. It is certainly a building 
block for a more inclusive and socially just society and it presents an opportunity for unions to show 




1 The ICESCR is a multilateral treaty adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 
December 1966. It came into force from 3 January 1976 and commits its parties to work toward the 
granting of  economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) to individuals, including labour rights and 
the right to health, the right to education and the right to an adequate standard of  living. As of  2013, 
the Covenant had 160 parties. 
2 A shebeen is a type of  ‘informal bar’ situated within residential areas. Shebeens are very common 
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